Ownership and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges

Johannes Köndgen

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 1, 224-

Abstract: Stock exchanges are financial institutions in rapid transition. Their organizational structure still varies to a considerable degree. This articles joins in the quest for an optimal organizational design for modern stock exchanges. From both a historical and comparative perspective it adopts, and attempts to further develop, a concept which analyzes stock exchanges as firms. Special attention is devoted to the question of whether regulatory concerns can be "internalized" into the governance structure of exchanges. It is submitted that the quest for "the" optiomal organizational design is futile and that the continuance of organizational diversity is a more likely scenario.

JEL-codes: G2 K3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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