What do Notaries do?. Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751

Philip Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 3, 499-

Abstract: Using evidence from 18th century Paris, we explore how financial intermediaries resolved problems of asymmetric information in financial markets. The Parisian intermediaries were notaries, and after examining their role in asset markets, we develop a more general model of intermediaries' behavior and then test the model using a rich set of data from Paris. Institutions for disseminating information insured that intermediaries provided high quality service, and such institutions were central to the growth of asset markets in pre-industrial Europe.

JEL-codes: D23 D82 G29 N23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751 (1994)
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