Tying Contracts and Asymmetric Information

Ulrich Kamecke

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 3, 531-

Abstract: Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential. This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product. The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements, the German Meto case and the US Amercian SCM case.

JEL-codes: L15 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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