Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic Development
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 4, 640-
Real-world rent seeking has been a puzzle to political economists, as they cannot observe as much direct social cost as commonly believed. In this paper, we identify socially inefficient technology commitment as a device for rent seekers to improve their positions in a zero-dissipation contest. We show that the domestic industry may forgo innovation opportunities which would be optimal decisions without rent-seeking uncertainty. This analysis also explains some conspicuous features of the farm subsidy programs in the US. We conclude by discussing rent-seeking's dynamic implication: the retarding of economic development.
JEL-codes: D72 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199812)154:4_640:rstcae_2.0.tx_2-l
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