Economics at your fingertips  

Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic Development

Chun-Lei Yang

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, vol. 154, issue 4, 640-

Abstract: Real-world rent seeking has been a puzzle to political economists, as they cannot observe as much direct social cost as commonly believed. In this paper, we identify socially inefficient technology commitment as a device for rent seekers to improve their positions in a zero-dissipation contest. We show that the domestic industry may forgo innovation opportunities which would be optimal decisions without rent-seeking uncertainty. This analysis also explains some conspicuous features of the farm subsidy programs in the US. We conclude by discussing rent-seeking's dynamic implication: the retarding of economic development.

JEL-codes: D72 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Biung-Ghi Ju

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Series data maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().

Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199812)154:4_640:rstcae_2.0.tx_2-l