Performance Monitoring and Financial Disclosure Choice

Phillip C. Stocken and Robert E. Verrecchia

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1999, vol. 155, issue 1, 214-

Abstract: We model the relationship between an entrepreneur's monitoring of a manager's performance and the entrepreneur's choice of the firm's financial disclosure policy. The environment is characterized by incomplete contracting and the presence of informed traders. We show that the entrepreneur may not generally choose to provide the most informative financial reporting disclosures to shareholders.

JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_214:pmafdc_2.0.tx_2-t

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().