Near Rationality in a Principal-Agent Framework

Anthony A. Sampson and Kevin Albertson

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2000, vol. 156, issue 2, 325-

Abstract: An agent who is near-rational in the sense of Akerlof and Yellen makes a slight mistake which has only a first-order effect ohnhis own utility. If he is constrained by a participation constraint on another party, as in a principal-agent relationship, the result only holds when the agent is subject to a truth-constraint.

JEL-codes: D5 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/2000/00000156/00000002/art00002 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200006)156:2_325:nriapf_2.0.tx_2-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().