Why do Workers Spend so Much Time on Inferior Tasks?

Otto Swank ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2000, vol. 156, issue 3, 501-

Abstract: This paper explains why agencies sometimes encourage their ablest workers to perform an inferior task. I develop a model in which workers' outputs in terms of the stated goal of the agency are sorrounded with uncertainty. When workers are evaluated on the basis of their contributions to the stated goal of the agency, a high ability worker runs the risk of being perceived as a low ability worker. High ability workers are only willing to work for the agency if they are compensated for this risk. To avoid compensation the agency may allow workers to perform a measurable, but inferior, task.

JEL-codes: D82 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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