Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information: The Role of Equity Participation
Sugata Marjit and
Arijit Mukherjee
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2001, vol. 157, issue 2, 282-300
Abstract:
Technological collaboration coupled with equity participation improves the quality of transacted technology relative to a situation characterised by a pure technology licensing agreement. Such a result is proved in a model of a signalling game with asymmetric information and threat of imitation. Different contractual arrangements involving equity participation with or without up-front fixed fee and/or output-based royalty payments are discussed.
JEL-codes: F21 F23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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