Should the Treasury Price Discriminate?. A Procedure for Computing Hypothetical Bid Functions

Daniel Heller and Yvan Lengwiler

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2001, vol. 157, issue 3, 413-429

Abstract: Ever since FRIEDMAN [1959], it has been debated whether the Treasury should sell bonds in a uniform or in a discriminatory auction. Empirical research on this topic has been confined to experiments in which both auctions were used. But these experiments inherently contain an identification problem, since differences cannot be attributed to the auction format alone. We develop a method for generating counterfactual data on discriminatory auctions, using real data from uniform-price Treasury bond auctions in Switzerland. Our method allows us to investigate the performance of the two auctions without relying on experiments and without the identification problem.

JEL-codes: D44 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/should-the- ... 16280932456013621279 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200109)157:3_413:sttpd_2.0.tx_2-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().