Indentured Migration in America's Great Basin: An Observation in Strategic Behavior in Cooperative Exchanges

Scott Alan Carson

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2001, vol. 157, issue 4, 651-676

Abstract: The Perpetual Emigrating Fund was a 19th century form of indentured migration that assisted European immigrants to America's Great Basin. Immigrants signed future contracts against their Great Basin labor to repay migration loans. The Fund encountered high monitoring costs to enforce contracts in rural areas. In the absence of a strong legal system, the Fund developed a series of enforcement mechanisms that relied on social norms and morays. Hence, the Perpetual Emigrating Fund demonstrates the success and failures of an institution that attempted to remain solvent with imperfect contracts and enforcement mechanisms.

JEL-codes: N0 N2 P0 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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