Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a Networked World

Randal C. Picker

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 1, 113-154

Abstract: In the pre-networked world, Windows played the central role in coordinating the sharing of software. The rise of the network changes how software should be distributed and changes the role of Windows in software coordination. There is less of a need for mandatory incorporation of software into Windows, as decentralized distribution and coordination is now possible. In impermissibly maintaining its monopoly, Microsoft distorted the channels for software distribution and added software to Windows for the purpose of raising the cost of distribution of rival software. Aproportionate Microsoft remedy should address that distributional distortion and seek to prevent future distortions. The article suggests such a remedy.

JEL-codes: K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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