How to Dissolve a Partnership

Benny Moldovanu ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 1, 66-80

Abstract: In a unified framework, we survey the recent literature on partnership dissolution with interdependent values. Contrary to the private-values case, where the main obstacle hindering the construction of efficient trading mechanisms is the asymmetry in initial endowments, we find that informational asymmetries play here a major role. For settings where the first-best cannot be achieved, we study incentive-efficient mechanisms or other well-performing simple mechanisms whose rules do not depend on the exact specification of the models' parameters.

JEL-codes: C78 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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