How to Dissolve a Partnership
Benny Moldovanu ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 1, 66-80
In a unified framework, we survey the recent literature on partnership dissolution with interdependent values. Contrary to the private-values case, where the main obstacle hindering the construction of efficient trading mechanisms is the asymmetry in initial endowments, we find that informational asymmetries play here a major role. For settings where the first-best cannot be achieved, we study incentive-efficient mechanisms or other well-performing simple mechanisms whose rules do not depend on the exact specification of the models' parameters.
JEL-codes: D44 D82 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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