A Principal-Agent Analysis of Fisheries

Frank Jensen () and Niels Vestergaard

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 2, 276-285

Abstract: Very little principal-agent analysis has been done within the fisheries economic literature. This paper conducts a principal-agent analysis of fisheries. Within a standard principal-agent model, the low-cost agent must be allowed the same level of effort as under complete information. This conclusion does not hold for fisheries, because of a resource restriction and the fact that maximisation takes place over two variables. By means of comparative-static analysis, this paper argues that the low-cost agent must be allowed a larger effort than under complete information.

JEL-codes: D2 L5 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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