No Utopia: Government Without Territorial Monopoly in Medieval Central Europe

Oliver Volckart

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 2, 325-343

Abstract: The paper examines the questions of how nonterritorial feudal governments in medieval central Europe emerged and what their tasks were, of how competition between these governments functioned, and of what consequences it had. The analysis leads to three hypotheses: (1) governmental nonterritoriality was mainly due to high monitoring costs, (2) intergovernmental competition entailed a high demand both for labor and for military security, and (3) competition had consequences that themselves undermined its viability and allowed governments with territorial monopolies to emerge. The paper shows furthermore why it is impossible under modern conditions to establish nonterritorial governments.

JEL-codes: H1 H4 H7 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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