An Information Saving and Efficient Nuisance Rule

Iljoong Kim

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 3, 514-527

Abstract: The existing literature postulates that in nuisance suits courts should balance, for a property right under conflict, several values of the litigating parties. This practice, however, is controversial, mainly due to courts´ resource scarcity. This paper suggests an alternative institutional mechanism with which to relieve courts of various disputes and the potential demoralization arising from the judicial comparison of subjective values. It further submits that Posner's nuisance rule can be fully utilized under imperfect information.

JEL-codes: D82 K11 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/artikel/an-informat ... 16280932456022975321
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200209)158:3_514:aisaen_2.0.tx_2-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().