Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations

Robert H. Mnookin

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2003, vol. 159, issue 1, 199-220

Abstract: This paper compares strategic barriers to the resolution of conflict - those that may arise because rational self-interested actors try to maximize individual returns - in two party and multi-party negotiations. It suggests that the Pareto-criterion may not provide an appropriate standard to evaluate efficiency in multiparty bargaining because a requirement of unanimity may create potential holdout problems that pose severe strategic barriers. While a variety of procedural rules may permit decision-making without unanimity, the paper briefly explores the application of an unusual procedural rule - the "sufficient consensus" standard - that was employed in the multiparty "constitutional" negotiations in South Africa and in Northern Ireland.

JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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