Mediating National Honour: Lessons from the Era of Dueling

Barry O'Neill

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2003, vol. 159, issue 1, 229-247

Abstract: In negotiations purely over interests, someone who initiates a concession but fails to reach agreement has lost nothing, but with honour at stake, initiating a concession reveals one as willing to compromise over honour. A mediator can help by suggesting a compromise that both parties would not propose themselves, and can obscure the identity of the first accepter. Another method, discussed by Jarque, Ponsatí and Sákovics, involves "secret concessions", has the mediator revealing each side's position to the other only when they become compatible. Other ways to mediate honour are illustrated by challenges to duel in pre-Civil War America.

JEL-codes: H56 J52 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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