Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Robert Cooter and Winand Emons

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2003, vol. 159, issue 2, 259-279

Abstract: In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truthrevealing mechanism. Moreover, we develop a truth-revealingmechanism for the same set of restrictions under which perjury rules operate. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually finds that the testimony was incorrect; the court need not determine that testimony was dishonest. We explain how truth-revealing mechanisms could combat distortions of observations by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including "junk science".

JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts (2000)
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