Yes-Men and No-Men: Does Defiance Signal Talent?

Jeong-Yoo Kim and Keunkwan Ryu

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2003, vol. 159, issue 3, 468-490

Abstract: We provide the rationale for the existence of yes-men and no-men in an organization or a group. On one hand, a person is inclined to conform to the instruction of another, because he cannot ignore the information contained in the instruction, even though his own evidence contradicts the instruction. On the other hand, if only the person himself knows the accuracy of his own information, he may tend to disobey the instruction, to make others believe that he is able in the sense that his information is accurate. We demonstrate that disobedience can signal high ability in an equilibrium.

JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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