Organizational Form and Information Acquisition

Thomas Gehrig

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, vol. 160, issue 1, 39-51

Abstract: It has been shown by Sah and Stiglitz [1986, 1988] that organizational form crucially affects societal information aggregation. This paper demonstrates that organizational form also crucially affects the incentives to acquire information. It is shown that relative allocative properties of organizations identified by Sah and Stiglitz can be reversed once endogenous information acquisition is possible. Implications for research joint ventures are discussed.

JEL-codes: D82 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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