Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures

Ulrich Kamecke

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, vol. 160, issue 1, 56-74

Abstract: Under constant returns to scale the only justification for joint ventures are externalities from knowledge spillovers. In a two-stage game we compare the incentives for integrated cartels and cartels with downstream competition. The externalities introduce an underinvestment incentive. Under downstream competition this effect is reinforced because a commitment to higher short run marginal costs increases the profits. In the integrated cartels the effect is partly offset by an overinvestment effect, because lower marginal costs lead to higher market shares. In an example we study the tradeoff between productive and allocative efficiency.

JEL-codes: L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/internaliza ... 28093245604773861285
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200403)160:1_56:ioksir_2.0.tx_2-h

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().