Political Process and Efficient Institutional Change

Yang Yao

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, vol. 160, issue 3, 439-453

Abstract: The efficiency hypothesis of institutional change is formulated in a general economic setting. The validity of this hypothesis depends on the specification of the new institution and the political process governing the institutional change. The issue is formulated as an implementation problem that asks whether the hypothesis can be implemented by a game form that consists of a well-behaved political process and a new institution. A general negative result is obtained, and an extension is developed to show the possibility of a positive result.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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