Unequal Treatment of Identical Polluters in Cournot Equilibrium

Per Andersen and Frank Jensen ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, vol. 161, issue 4, 729-734

Abstract: Oligopoly models where firms and other agents take prior actions that subsequently affect the marginal costs have long been useful in illuminating policy debates with respect to antitrust regulation, environmental protection, and international competition. In this paper we illustrate the relevance in an environmental Cournot game, where the production technology is characterised by constant returns to scale. It is shown that an asymmetric distribution of emission quotas can be optimal in some, but not all, cases.

JEL-codes: C72 D62 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/unequal-tre ... 28093245605775075933 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200512)161:4_729:utoipi_2.0.tx_2-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().