Using Optional Job Rotation Programs to Gauge On-the-Job Learning

Anil Arya () and Brian Mittendorf

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, vol. 162, issue 3, 505-515

Abstract: This paper presents one reason for adopting diverse work assignments, rooted in a desire to match employees' pay with the skills they have cultivated on the job. When on-the-job learning parlays into attractive external opportunities, employees may threaten to seek a different and higher paying job elsewhere. By instituting an optional job rotation program, a firm can offer such an opportunity internally. Since new tasks are difficult for employees to undertake, compensation arrangements can be structured to guarantee that only a truly skilled (versatile) employee wants to take on such a challenge.

JEL-codes: D82 J24 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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