University Funding Reform, Competition, and Teaching Quality

Alexander Kemnitz

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2007, vol. 163, issue 2, 356-378

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of university funding reform on teaching-quality competition. It shows that a graduate tax with differentiated, but state-regulated fees maximises the higher-education surplus, whereas student grants as well as pure and income-contingent loans do not. Fee autonomy for universities leads to results inferior to properly state-controlled fees and can make the majority of students even worse off than a central student assignment system with very poor teaching incentives.

JEL-codes: H52 I22 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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