The Market as Organization

Rudolf Richter

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2007, vol. 163, issue 3, 483-492

Abstract: It is argued that not only hierarchies but also markets can be seen as modes of organization. Potential traders face the problem of choosing first a specific market organization before they start trading. Attention is focused on implicitly agreed-upon market organizations. They are interpreted as equilibrium organizations of markets in the sense of the institution-as-an-equilibrium-of-a-game approach. This is illustrated for the case of price leadership cum advertising competition - exemplified by the American cigarette industry between the two World Wars. As a result, the theory of oligopoly appears in a different light. (JEL: D 02, D 83, L 14, Z 13)

JEL-codes: D02 D83 L14 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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