Contractual Enforcement Institutions and the Structure of Information

Avery W. Katz

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, vol. 164, issue 1, 134-154

Abstract: Many economic writers on contract theory have assumed that legal institutions are simply unable to do the job of enforcement, and have thus attempted to devise arrangements that motivate the parties to keep their commitments even though a government tribunal would be unable to tell whether they had performed. But non-legal enforcement mechanisms operate both as substitutes and complements for legal mechanisms (and as substitutes and complements for each other). This essay sketches how parties should choose among available enforcement mechanisms, based on the costs of information and other transaction costs.

JEL-codes: D86 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/contractual ... 101628jite-2008-0008 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_134:ceiats_2.0.tx_2-

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().