Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
Andreas Blume and
Paul Heidhues ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, vol. 164, issue 1, 163-184
We study tacit collusion, which we interpret as collusion without communication about strategies, in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning an auction. We obtain two classes of results: (1) Completely refraining from using names rules out collusion altogether, and even if naming is permitted, as per our definition of tacit collusion, the lack of communication limits collusive strategies and payoffs among impatient bidders. (2) Sufficiently patient bidders can overcome the attainability constraints imposed by lack of communication and obtain approximately the same collusive gain as absent communication.
JEL-codes: C73 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/modeling-ta ... 101628jite-2008-0012 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_163:mtcia_2.0.tx_2-y
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C
More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().