Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework

Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, vol. 164, issue 1, 52-67

Abstract: The main goal of the court system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those who did not. We describe a mechanism design framework that facilitates the characterization of a set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve this goal. This framework can also help to formulate and evaluate procedural rules, and to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding disputes according to substantive law with minimal costs of litigation and delay. We illustrate our approach using three examples: fee-shifting rules, discovery rules, and third-party alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

JEL-codes: C72 D70 D82 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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