Mergers and CEO Power

Felipe Balmaceda ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2009, vol. 165, issue 3, 454-486

Abstract: I propose a model of mergers in which synergies and CEO power play a crucial role. A merger is modeled as a bargaining game between the acquiring and the target board of directors, with the gains from a merger divided according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The model's implications are consistent with the available empirical evidence on stock returns, and yield some new untested implications that are mainly related to the relationship between CEO power, corporate governance, and mergers. Finally, the model sheds light on the relationship between aggregate merger activity, synergies, and CEO power.

JEL-codes: D21 D86 G34 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/mergers-and ... 28093245609789471943 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Mergers and CEO power (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200909)165:3_454:macp_2.0.tx_2-j

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().