Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement

Holger Spamann

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2010, vol. 166, issue 1, 149-165

Abstract: This paper empirically compares civil procedure in common-law and civil-law countries. Using World-Bank and hand-collected data, and unlike earlier studies that used predecessor data sets, this paper finds no systematic differences between common- and civil-law countries in the complexity, formalism, duration, or cost of procedure in courts of first instance. The paper further finds that by a subjective measure, contract enforceability in common-law countries is higher than in French, but lower than in German and Scandinavian, civil-law countries. Given civil procedure's central role for the common-civil-law distinction, these findings challenge the distinction's economic relevance.

JEL-codes: K40 K41 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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