The Effect of Contract Regulation on Franchising

Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi () and Larry E. Ribstein

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2012, vol. 168, issue 1, 38-53

Abstract: Previous work on the regulation of termination clauses in franchise contracts has ignored the ability of parties to contract around state law. Using data on two national fast-food restaurants, we find that Washington, D.C.'s termination restriction which did not restrict choice-of-law provisions had little systematic effect on business practice, while Iowa's termination restriction which did prohibit choice-of-law provisions had a large negative effect on franchising.

JEL-codes: D86 K12 K20 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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