Coercion and Consent

James Konow ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2014, vol. 170, issue 1, 49-74

Abstract: Most moral justifications for coercion have been based on one of two arguments: the consent of the coerced, usually understood as univariate and discrete, or the beneficial consequences of coercion; but many cases do not fit these categories. This paper proposes that consent be understood as our inferences about the agreement of agents, which vary in fine degrees with multiple underlying factors, including agent discretion, the choice set, information, and competence. Moreover, consent interacts with other moral values, including consequences, in a pluralistic system of morals that depends on the context. Examples suggest this framework can be reconciled with moral intuitions better than rival systems.

JEL-codes: B3 D6 D7 H1 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/coercion-an ... 45614x13871984731086 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201403)170:1_49:cac_2.0.tx_2-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13871984731086

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().