Task Interdependence and Noncontractibility in Public-Good Provision

Bin R. Chen and Y. Stephen Chiu

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2014, vol. 170, issue 4, 731-748

Abstract: In the context of public-good provision, despite noncontractibility of investments, it is possible to specify who is in charge of tasks such as construction and maintenance. We show that complementarity between the investments of the two tasks favors unbundling of tasks through different contracts against bundling of them into a single contract, whether the built facility is privately or publicly owned. We also obtain general conditions that determine the efficiency of traditional procurement vis-à-vis public-private partnership (PPP).

JEL-codes: D23 H11 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14001382825066

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