The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study

Adam S. Chilton

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2015, vol. 171, issue 1, 181-201

Abstract: Research examining whether the laws of war change state behavior has produced conflicting results, and limitations of observational studies have stalled progress on the topic. To bring new evidence to the debate, I have conducted a survey experiment that directly tests whether one mechanism hypothesized to drive compliance with international law - changes in public opinion - creates pressure to comply with the laws of war. The results provide qualified support to research suggesting that democracies may comply with the laws of war when there is the expectation of reciprocity.

JEL-codes: F51 F53 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14188909230370

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