Multidimensional Cheap Talk and Delegation

Jaehoon Kim and Lawrence S. Rothenberg

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2015, vol. 171, issue 2, 263-284

Abstract: We analyse a cheap-talk game where contrasting lobbies are asymmetrically informed. Equilibrium information transmission depends on each lobby´s preference alignment with the legislator on the dimension of its expertise, and on the conflict of lobby interests. Full revelation is possible only when each lobby´s preference on its expertise is completely aligned with the legislator´s. Otherwise, greater preference alignment and lowered lobbyist conflict induce more transmission. We also show that results are sensitive to the legislator´s expertise. In turn, we demonstrate how informational impacts provide predictions about when legislators will delegate to an expert, and we note our analyses´ broader empirical implications.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/multidimens ... 45615x14273596658883 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201506)171:2_263:mctad_2.0.tx_2-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14273596658883

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().