Multiunion Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition

Hamid Aghadadashli and Christian Wey

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2015, vol. 171, issue 4, 666-695

Abstract: We study (efficient) sequential bargaining between two unions and a single firm. If unions are perfectly substitutable (tariff competition ), then there is a first-mover advantage and the second union is foreclosed. If unions are perfectly complementary (tariff plurality ), then there is a second-mover advantage, so that the first union's wage bill is smaller than the second union's. If unions represent worker groups each producing a differentiated good, then overemployment (underemployment) occurs when goods are substitutable (complementary). Unions merge when workers are substitutable but stay separate when they are complementary, so that the inefficiencies associated with craft unionism persist.

JEL-codes: D42 J51 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Multi-union bargaining: Tariff plurality and tariff competition (2014)
Working Paper: Multi-union Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition (2014)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14302136524833

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