Political Selection with Cynical Voters

Alvaro Forteza ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2015, vol. 171, issue 4, 735-750

Abstract: I consider political agency models with endogenous entry of candidates. Two equilibria may arise, one in which only good individuals go into politics and another in which both bad and good individuals do so. These equilibria are self-fulfilling prophecies: voter cynicism raises the survival probabilities of bad politicians and thus induces bad citizens to start a career in politics. If the proportion of good individuals in the society is sufficiently high, the model will show only the good equilibrium. I analyze the impact of popularity shocks on the set of equilibria.

JEL-codes: D72 O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/political-s ... 45615x14321895623371 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201512)171:4_735:pswcv_2.0.tx_2-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14321895623371

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().