Cooperation in Partnerships: The Role of Breakups and Reputation

Ralph-C Bayer ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2016, vol. 172, issue 4, 615-638

Abstract: 1000 We investigate experimentally if endogenous partnership formation improves efficiency in social dilemmas. Subjects play multiple two-player public-goods games, where they can break up with their partner periodically. A stable-marriage mechanism based on rankings provided by singles determines the new matches. We vary the information subjects have on possible matches and whether staying in a partnership leads to a cost or a bonus. We find that endogenous group formation can increase efficiency. Both the provision of contribution history and bonuses have positive effects. At least one of these factors is required for efficiency improvements. The presence of both leads to the best results.

JEL-codes: D03 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Cooperation in Partnerships: The Role of Breakups and Reputation (2011)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14610627109836

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Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

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