Sequential Negotiations: Substitutes versus Complements

Bjørn-Atle Reme and Lars Sørgard

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2016, vol. 172, issue 4, 639-644

Abstract: This paper analyzes a sequential negotiation game where a retailer and its two suppliers negotiate over the sharing of their jointly created surplus. We show that the suppliers each prefer to negotiate first (second) if the suppliers are substitutes (complements) in producing joint surplus, while the retailer is indifferent to the order of negotiations.

JEL-codes: L14 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14605537965102

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