EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cost-of-Completion versus Diminution-of-Value Damages for Deliberate Breach: An Economic Analysis

Abraham L. Wickelgren

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 1, 4-17

Abstract: Whether to measure expectation damages by the cost of completing the contract or the buyer's loss in value is a central, unresolved issue in contract law. This paper analyzes the issue assuming that the buyer places unobservable, idiosyncratic value on performance. While cost of completion deters efficient breach, diminution of value induces inefficient breach. The latter is more severe the more likely is large idiosyncratic value. Cost of completion also tends to be superior if the event (low market value/high cost) leading to the breach is very likely, because then the existence of the contract itself indicates substantial idiosyncratic value.

JEL-codes: K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/costofcompl ... 45616x14743741664593 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201703)173:1_4:cvddfd_2.0.tx_2-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14743741664593

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201703)173:1_4:cvddfd_2.0.tx_2-9