Job Hoarding

Matthew Baker and Ingmar Nyman

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 4, 688-722

Abstract: We study a labor market in which employers and workers search for a trading partner, and workers have private information about the value of a match. We show that competitive pressure can induce workers to take jobs for which they are ill suited. This leads to insufficient frictional unemployment and search, and lower average productivity and utility. A fully tax-financed unemployment benefit can eliminate the inefficiency. Moreover, because inefficient job hoarding by workers occurs when there are many workers per job, the analysis suggests a novel explanation for the stylized macroeconomic fact that labor productivity is procyclical.

JEL-codes: D24 D82 D83 E32 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/job-hoardin ... 45617x14860182052051 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Job Hoarding (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201712)173:4_688:jh_2.0.tx_2-

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

DOI: 10.1628/093245617X14860182052051

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().