The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies

Barna Bakó and Attila Tasnádi

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 4, 753-768

Abstract: We extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved. We also investigate the case of public Stackelberg leadership and that of private Stackelberg leadership.

JEL-codes: D43 H44 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies (2014)
Working Paper: The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies (2014)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245617X14875974729938

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