Politics under Xi Jinping: Centralization and its Implications

Kazuko Kozima
Additional contact information
Kazuko Kozima: Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University

Public Policy Review, 2020, vol. 16, issue 3, 1-21

Abstract: This article discusses the centralization implemented by the Xi Jinping administration and its meanings. What the Xi Jinping administration envisages to realize by this centralization is that a disciplined party will centralize the government, military, and industry from the center to the periphery, thereby establishing a fair and sound market economy. The Xi Jinping administration believes that if China continues to diversify and liberalize its economy while maintaining a trend in which connections and honor take precedence over the rule of law, corruption will be fostered and the country will be thrown into disorder by the slackening of governance. The administration is trying to achieve centralization by strengthening the authority of its leaders, strengthening discipline, conducting thorough supervision through the use of inspection (xunshi 巡视) and controlling and exposing people through the rule of law. However, excessive centralization provokes opposition not only from liberal intellectuals, but also from the party leadership. There is a high possibility that the centralization will be watered down by the bureaucracy, who are pretending to obey but secretly betraying. In addition, if the design and operation of credit scoring systems result in human rights violations, the international community will be forced to intensify its criticism.

Keywords: Xi Jinping; Centralization; Inspection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp_review/ppr16_03_02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mof:journl:ppr16_03_02

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Policy Review from Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Policy Research Institute ().