Xi Jinping's Governance Vision as Reflected in Institutional Restructuring

Kazuko Kojima
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Kazuko Kojima: Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio Universiy

Public Policy Review, 2025, vol. 21, issue 3, 1-25

Abstract: This paper analyzes institutional restructuring to interpret the governance vision of the Xi Jinping administration and examine its challenges. The Xi administration aims to build a strong state by ensuring the rule by law, strengthening central authority in key national policy areas such as taxation and finance, and overcoming the inefficiencies of the bureaucratic system. At the same time, it seeks to reduce the bloated bureaucracy and establish a governance system suited to a market economy. Additionally, to prevent internal discord within the administration caused by painful reforms and to suppress potential regime threats from both domestic and foreign actors, Xi has placed trusted allies in key positions in propaganda, public security, and the military, enforcing a highly authoritarian rule. While this approach demonstrates a strong sense of purpose and high execution capacity, it also carries significant risks. One major risk is the potential failure of governance due to excessive authoritarianism, which could hinder free policy discussions and the utilization of expert knowledge, ultimately leading to policy missteps. Another challenge is the risk of stagnation and disorder within the governance apparatus, as institutional restructuring may disrupt the internal balance within the Party and government, complicating personnel management and policy execution. Furthermore, the absence of a clear successor to Xi Jinping raises concerns about the stability of leadership transition in the post-Xi era, creating uncertainty regarding the continuity of governance reforms. The success or failure of the Xi administration’s governance reforms will largely depend on how effectively it can manage these risks while maintaining political stability and economic governance.

Keywords: Xi Jinping; Institutional Restructuring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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