Tenders and service contracts for local public transport

Marco Alderighi and Giuliano Sparacino

Economia dei Servizi, 2008, issue 1, 99-114

Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between the service contract (and tender) design and the outcome of the tender in the local public tran sport. Data are collected through a survey involving about 50 territorial entities. It emerges that optimal contract (and tender) design crucially depends on the objective function of the regulator. Participation is encouraged by a semi-rigid model, by gross cost contracts, by weak incentives and by opportunity of sub-contracting. Vice versa, rebates are favoured by long duration of the contract, by strong incentives and (again) by opportunity for sub-contracting. Finally, having a new winner is favoured by strong incentives, by asset availability.

Keywords: tender; service contracts; local public transport (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:j1t56u:doi:10.2382/26334:y:2008:i:1:p:99-114

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