Cross Regional Heterogeneity of Individual Attitudes Towards Public Management of Local Services. An Empirical Analysis Based on Italian Data
Salvatore Ercolano
Economia dei Servizi, 2014, issue 3, 259-270
Abstract:
Over the last years, scholars looked at the decentralization of competences as a possible solution for several issue of public finance. Despite the development of a new branch in fiscal federalism theory (the so-called Second Generation Theory), the homogeneity of preferences at local level still represents one of the main assumption in this literature. This hypothesis allows assuming that a local allocation of public services minimizes the welfare losses that a central allocation could generate. The present contribution tries to underline how the homogeneity of preferences continues to represent a central topic in fiscal federalism theory, finding in the information issue a kind of "trait d'union" between them. Moreover, by means of an empirical analysis on the Italian case, we will try to analyze if individual attitudes towards a public management of local ser- vices present a greater heterogeneity at macroregional (NUTS1) or regional (NUTS2) level.
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism; Preferences; Local Public Services. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:j1t56u:doi:10.2382/81952:y:2014:i:3:p:259-270
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