 To Be or Not to Be a G-SIB: Does It Matter?Sebastian Schich and Oana Toader () Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, 2017, issue 2, 169-192 Abstract: Elements of recent bank regulatory reform directly focus on ending the "too-big-to-fail" phenomenon. As part of these efforts, a number of banks have been designated as "globally systemically important banks" (henceforth G-SIBs) and a tighter regulatory, supervisory and resolution failure regime has been imposed on them. The present article asks what has been the effect of this special treatment on the value of implicit bank debt guarantees of these banks, as measured by credit rating uplifts. Based on a sample of 27 G-SIBs and a control group of 177 other large banks from 23 countries for the 2007 to 2015 period, the article finds that this treatment has not yet significantly altered the value of implicit bank debt guarantees for G-SIBs. They continue to benefit from a significantly higher value of implicit guarantee than other banks. The article also finds that tightened resolution practices, at the national level, have significantly reduced the value of implicit guarantees for other banks, but not for G-SIB banks. Keywords: Bank Failure Resolution; G-SIB; Too-big-to-fail; Implicit Guarantees. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jdp901:doi:10.12831/88826:y:2017:i:2:p:169-192 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions from Società editrice il Mulino |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.