Banche, riassetti proprietari e privatizzazioni

Marcello Messori

Stato e mercato, 1998, issue 1, 93-126

Abstract: This paper aims to show that the inefficiencies in the working of the Italian banking system can hinder that reallocation of the property rights as well as those processes of privatization which could allow an increase in the competitiveness of the Italian economic system in the European market characterized by EMU. I begin from an assessment of the strong regulation which was typical of the Italian credit market until ten years ago. I then analyze the consequences of the partial liberalization on the property rights allocation of the Italian banks. This analysis points out that the ownership structure of the Italian banking system and its internal linkages are one of the main reasons for its inefficient working. In the last three sections of the paper, I specify this conclusion by referring to the recent concentration processes between the Italian biggest banks as well as to the changes in the organization and in the financial supply of the regional and local banks.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mul:jl9ury:doi:10.1425/407:y:1998:i:1:p:93-126

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