The puzzle of human cooperation

Dominic D. P. Johnson (), Pavel Stopka and Stephen Knights
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Dominic D. P. Johnson: Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University
Pavel Stopka: Charles University
Stephen Knights: University of Oxford

Nature, 2003, vol. 421, issue 6926, 911-912

Abstract: Abstract Humans often defy rational-choice theory by cooperating in simple dilemma games1, a paradox that has been explained by theories of kin selection2, reciprocal altruism3 and indirect reciprocity (reputation)4. Fehr and Gächter claim that human cooperation remains an evolutionary puzzle because people will cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people whom they may not meet again, and without any gain in reputation ('strong reciprocity')5 — that is, when existing theories do not seem to apply. However, we argue that those theories are rejected for the wrong reasons and that the paradox may therefore be imaginary. This has implications for whether punishment is crucial to promoting cooperation5,6,7,8.

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1038/421911b

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